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THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION¹

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Motivations to the psychology of religion have come from numerous sources. Of these the most important are: (a) the desire for larger and more significant achievement—in religious education, for example, or the training of religious workers, or the promotion of a truer understanding and a wider sympathy between differently minded individuals and groups; (b) the need of psychological analyses in connection with philosophical and historical investigations of religion and with the various problems of anthropology, sociology, and the history of culture; (c) the “feeling of wonder,” as Plato called it; “the craving of our understanding to know the laws of phenomena,” to use the words of Comte. These motivations likewise furnish an insight into the spirit that animates the psychology of religion and also into the nature of its tasks.

Because of the wide differences that prevail, section two of the paper undertakes a survey of the sources from which religious psychologists have derived their data, of the methods and points of view they have adopted, of the conceptions of mind with which they have operated, and of their assumptions or conclusions regarding the relation of the psychology of religion to theology and philosophy.

Finally, a general appraisal is offered, followed by the mention of a number of problems to which it would appear that religious psychologists should now address themselves.

I

“Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the ignorance of the cause frustrates the effect. . . . That which in contemplative philosophy corresponds with the cause, in practical science becomes the rule.” With this aphorism Francis Bacon gave formulation, in his *Novum Organum*, to a

¹ This paper, prepared at the request of the Editor, aims to suggest something of the spirit, methods, achievements, and present problems of the psychology of religion, with the thought of broadening the orientation and clarifying the perspective of those as yet only vaguely familiar with this field. In the space available it will be impossible to review, or even to make a comprehensive survey of, the literature of the subject. Where the course of exposition conveniently allows, however, references will be made to such of the more readily accessible publications (especially in English) as deal significantly with large or numerous aspects of religion and will therefore be of vital interest to the general reader. An extensive alphabetical bibliography, together with a very helpful topical bibliography, are now available in Coe's *The Psychology of Religion* (University of Chicago Press). Other lists of related writings may be found in Pratt's *The Psychology of Religious Belief* and King's *The Development of Religion*.

then relatively novel conception of the nature of genuine knowledge. Today, indeed, the phrase "Knowledge Is Power" has received wide currency because of its adoption as the motto or advertising slogan of numerous educational institutions. But it should not be overlooked that it was the emergence of the conception expressed, together with the changes it involved in the methods of acquiring truth, that signaled the dawn of modern thought. Thenceforth truth came to be sought and formulated in such ways as to have direct applicability to practice. Hence the quest for knowledge gained impetus from the desire for achievement. Earlier modes of interpretation still continued. Yet a new era was inaugurated: that of scientific inquiry. Inductive investigation disclosed uniformities and laws; and through their utilization desired ends could be attained much more securely and economically than through the crude, haphazard methods of trial and error or rule of thumb.

This distinctively modern procedure, however, gained headway in other fields long before it was turned to the advantage of religion. Strange as in certain respects it may seem, man's curiosity has always been focused on things distant—on celestial bodies, the objects of the physical environment, and their origins—long before it was aroused by the things closer than hands or feet, such as the moral experience or the religious life. So also it was not until a relatively late stage of development that any carefully thought-out and systematically executed attempt was made to control or develop the latter along lines consciously evaluated as reasonable and desirable. Even so, these attempts in their beginnings encountered strongly intrenched opposition. In connection with matters of lesser significance, it was readily conceded that no effort of intelligence should be spared; indeed, vigorous and sustained thought was regarded as no less a moral duty than industry, persistence, conscientiousness, and other prerequisites of large and permanent success. But

in the sphere of religion it was long felt by the rank and file of ecclesiastics and of traditionalists that the search for accurate, scientific knowledge or its methodical application is an affront to the deity. The increase of religion in individual and institutional life was thought to lie in the kind providence of God. Yet not entirely. Man might, and should, co-operate so long as he did so more or less thoughtlessly, that is, without utilizing empirical observation of a scientific sort for the discovery of methods adapted to securing results whose value was determined by an appeal to experience.

The psychology of religion, however, has enjoyed a rapid development and has time and again been vindicated by its fruits. A survey of its origin and its growth would make it entirely clear that a practical motive has throughout been potently operative. In the early eighties of the last century, G. Stanley Hall, having reported numerous sudden changes, both physiological and psychological, that dramatically proclaim the advent of adolescence, proceeded to set forth the lessons to be drawn by those concerned with the development of character. From the very outset he, with a number of students whom he inspired, regarded their tasks, in truly Socratic spirit, as maieutic. Under the pressure of genetic psychology, and shortly thereafter of the psychology of religion, conceptions regarding education and training in religion and morals rapidly underwent far-reaching transformations. The methods at present proposed, and increasingly pursued, diverge so widely from those of a generation ago that one might safely refer to the latter as having been revolutionized. This advance—for such it unquestionably is—must be credited largely to those who have laid bare the fundamental characteristics of personal growth and of religious experience, just as, in turn, the scholars in these fields received zeal from a consideration of the bearing of their studies upon the matter of supreme moment to mankind. A clear idea of the shift in religious viewpoint and activity which followed in the wake of the attempt to under-

stand religion through observation and psychological analysis may be gained by referring to an early work of Coe's entitled *Education in Religion and Morals*; and a comparison of this work with the same author's recent book, *A Social Theory of Religious Education*, will bring out vividly the rapidity with which the newer methods of procedure have furthered our knowledge of religious processes.

Turning to Bridges' *The Religion of Experience* we find another significant ministry of the infant science of religion. The author is impressed by the need of "a principle which shall bind together *all* the members of the nation, and, in time, all the nations of the earth." Realizing that this calls for the discovery of "some fresh standpoint from which the doctrines and disciplines of all faiths may be seen in a new light and re-valued," he is led to inquire concerning the needs "which have urged men into religious fellowships, and induced them to elaborate the various inadequate philosophies called theologies, and the numerous systems of worship, prayer and sacrament." With a knowledge of these needs he hopes that there may come some suggestion for meeting them by means "upon which there could be the same kind of practical agreement as there is in regard to the findings of physical science." Whatever may be one's judgment concerning the possibility or desirability of the precise objective that Mr. Bridges seems to have in mind, one may confidently expect that, with the increase and diffusion of psychological knowledge, religion will become less and less spiritually divisive. Bigotry, conceit, dogmatism, sheer intolerance, will wane. Understanding cannot but foster that mutual respect and sympathy which is demanded of the truly righteous and is basic not alone to fruitful co-operation but likewise to every other form of satisfactory human relationship.

The contributions which the psychology of religion is capable of making to this great cause, as well as to that of religious education in the widest meanings of this term, doubt-

less exceed our most hopeful imaginations. Moreover, there are few problems connected with the promotion of religion that may not receive illumination through psychology—to mention but a single additional one, the training of religious workers. Yet here as elsewhere it would be a matter of deep regret if scholars allowed questions of a too immediately practical urgency to deflect them from more general investigations looking toward the discovery of fundamental principles.

It is inadequate, as we have seen, to think of the psychology of religion exclusively in connection with religious education. Only less so would it be to regard its various utilitarian aspects as exhaustive. Factors of a different sort have likewise played a formative rôle, contributing to both its problems and its spirit. Not infrequently it is said that the psychology of religion is essentially a product of the twentieth century or that it dates back, at furthest, less than three decades. This statement is true only if we are referring to it as an independent, empirical science. Religionists of all times and places have given spontaneous utterance to their impulses and experiences; and, as rational beings, they have engaged in description, interpretation, and theory. Simple statements of psychological import occur wherever there is religion, and even so sophisticated a doctrine, for example, as *timor fecit deos* trails back into the hoary past. Critical, self-conscious psychologizing appeared almost as early as theology and the philosophy of religion. By the time of Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Feuerbach, psychological analysis was regularly developed or psychological theory appealed to in connection with such problems as the origin of religion, the basis of religion in the life of the individual, the primary trait or traits of religious experience, the relation of religion to morality and to art, and the significance of its ideational and doctrinal aspects. Ever since, philosophical interpretations of religion have tended to build on phenomenological foundations involving a vast deal of a psychological nature.

In the meantime various social sciences found it difficult to move hand or foot without recourse to psychology; at the least, they operated, more or less unconsciously, with assumptions requiring psychological examination. Historians of religion, as well as of culture generally, anthropologists, and sociologists found religion to be one of the strongest and most pervasive social factors. Whether we turn, therefore, to those movements on the continent exemplified by the *Zeitschrift fuer Voelkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* or to such monumental British works as Tylor's *Primitive Culture* or Frazer's *Golden Bough* or to the monographs on the cultures of particular peoples, we note how multitudinous and inescapable were the facts which claimed attention and yet were unintelligible without a psychological analysis of concepts and practices of a religious sort. Thus the investigation of social phenomena generally, as well as of religion in both its philosophical and its historical aspects, generated problems and developed theories which prepared the way for a psychology of religion thoroughly independent in its procedure and possessing a technique of its own. This emancipation, however, did not and cannot involve release from all connection; the responsibility and the necessity for full co-operation remain. Pratt has indeed very recently insisted on leaving such questions as that concerning the origin of the belief in God or gods to the "anthropologists and the historians, not to mention the theologians, the sociologists, and the philologists," holding that the psychologist's problems are "the less speculative and more hopeful ones." A more tenable position, however, is adopted by Mueller-Freienfels when he holds, in his *Psychologie der Religion*, that the psychologists too must deal with the whole range of social phenomena; though not concerned to determine what were the particular facts—the specific details of the cult of a certain group, for example—or even with a description of the facts as such, they are concerned with the psychological factors underlying them and with exhibiting

their psychical necessity. Surely it is safe to say that social scientists require the assistance of the psychologist in interpreting religious facts; and the psychologist depends upon the historian, anthropologist, and sociologist for a knowledge of those specific, concrete data without which intelligent procedure is in many cases quite impossible to him. Fine products of such activity on the part of psychologists are presented in various chapters of Ames's *The Psychology of Religious Experience* and of King's *The Development of Religion*. Among the works of the social scientists that stand out are Marett's *The Threshold of Religion* and a study by Durkheim translated under the title, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*.

But he who seeks a fairly complete view regarding either the origin or the present character of the psychology of religion must bear in mind still a further consideration. Plato remarked in the *Theaetetus* that "the feeling of wonder is the genuine mark of the philosopher for philosophy has its origin in wonder." This observation is not without point with respect also to science and all accurate knowledge. Wundt has called attention to the fact that it was not until curiosity was sufficiently keen to be aroused not solely by the exceptional and startling but also by the usual and the commonplace that magical conceptions became displaced by those of natural law. Carlyle has characteristically said that "the Man who does not wonder, who does not habitually wonder (and worship), were he President of innumerable Royal Societies, and carried the whole *Méchanique Celeste* and Hegel's Philosophy, and the epitome of all laboratories and observations with their results, in his single head . . . is but a Pair of Spectacles behind which there is no Eye." To understand the spirit of the psychology of religion, then, one must appreciate the point of two remarkable sentences of Comte's:

However great may be the services rendered to Industry by science, however true may be the saying that Knowledge is Power, we must

never forget that the sciences have a higher destination still; and not only higher, but more direct—that of satisfying the craving of our understanding to know the laws of phenomena. To feel how deep and urgent this need is, we have only to consider for a moment the physiological effects of *consternation*, and to remember that the most terrible sensation we are capable of, is that which we experience when any phenomenon seems to arise in violation of the familiar laws of nature.

It is not without significance that the early studies now definitely thought of as inaugurating the psychology of religion, and the first volume thus entitled (Starbuck's *The Psychology of Religion*, 1900) centered pretty much about the phenomena of conversion. True, these are intrinsically attention-arresting and at the time were essential elements in evangelical religions which constituted a significant as well as a vociferous factor in American life. To understand why conversion so early became an object of study, however, we must bear in mind that *prima facie*, as also in current belief, it seemed, while a matter of experience, nevertheless to lie on the yonder side of anything explicable in terms of psychological or other scientific laws. Indeed, the query was often raised whether it did not represent an exception to or a violation of such laws. The scientific mind could not but regard this as a clear challenge; and to the challenge the investigations of Starbuck and Leuba were an earnest and vigorous response. Now, religious experience in general seems to stand apart in its depth and significance, and many of its aspects and expressions, besides conversion, seem genuinely unique. Hence it has been an object peculiarly stimulating to the theoretical interest as this is described by Comte. Supplementing the curiosity that in general impels to a search for facts and their relations is the concern to exhibit the relevancy of scientific method throughout the entire range of human experience.

II

The motivations and hence the character and the tasks of the psychology of religion are, as we have noticed, complex.

Manifold too are the sources from which it derives its data, and numerous the methods of approach or points of view it adopts, as well as the conceptions of mind with which it operates. Diverse views have also developed with respect to the relation of the psychology of religion to philosophy and to theology. Let us briefly consider these points in turn.

In their search for data Starbuck and the earlier writers very naturally turned to living experiences. For, concerning these, direct information could be obtained, and from the outset empiricism has been the watchword of psychological students of religion. So they circulated as widely and representatively as possible carefully prepared lists of questions, the answers to which they analyzed with the purpose of reaching generalizations as well as of detecting differences. Though the questionnaire would seem to make facts available at first hand, many objections have nevertheless come to be urged against its use. Attention has been called to the difficulty of avoiding "leading" questions and of securing replies genuinely representative, since the distribution of the forms is after all geographically, linguistically, or culturally restricted, and only those individuals having certain interests will respond—and these perhaps only in part (for a variety of reasons), or in unclear or stock terms, or inaccurately, due to language or memory limitations or to lack of experience in introspection. Obviously the method is not satisfactory in the case of children and numerous other groups; interpretation, moreover, is hampered by the insufficient information which the replies yield concerning the personal characteristics, life-history, and cultural environment of the respondents; and the questionnaire affords the basis for little more than statistics and a certain limited description, causal or other relationships lying quite beyond its power to illumine. A very interesting attempt to supplement the questionnaire is reported in Coe's *The Spiritual Life*. Through personal interviews, doubtful points were cleared up; through scrutiny of the

respondents and conferences with their friends and associates, objective evidence was obtained as to the item of temperament; various facts relating to their suggestibility were ascertained through hypnotic experiments. Thus light was thrown upon certain conditions underlying the heterogeneity of religious experiences. James supplemented the questionnaire in still a different way. Individualist that he was, yet also convinced that the ordinary run of experience tends simply to reproduce the current temper and ideas, he believed that the essence of the religious spirit is best discovered in the persons of religious dissenters and innovators, of prophets and reformers, of mystics and enthusiasts. Autobiographical and other records portraying these unique religious characters were freely used, along with the reports of living individuals, for the masterly interpretations in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Though with far less appeal to historical eccentricities, it was to individual experiences that Höffding likewise turned for his material for the psychological section of his profound *Philosophy of Religion*. The data for Stratton's *The Psychology of the Religious Life*, on the other hand, were supplied by the literary expressions and other monuments of religion. These were considered by the author to exhibit the spirit not merely of their creators but also of their adherents far more objectively and instructively than confessions, autobiographies, or responses to specific questions; for they are spontaneous expressions arising from situations when men, instead of being self-conscious, are "themselves," "off their guard." Ames, on the other hand, has turned primarily to the customs and ceremonials of groups, with a predilection for those of simpler cultures; while Durkheim has chosen the path of very detailed and intensive study of a single region, Australia. Fielding Hall's *The Soul of a People* is a penetrating description based on a careful, sympathetic observation of the living beliefs of a single people. Wundt and his followers have acted on the conviction that a significant psychology of religion must be

a phase of a psychological interpretation of the development of human culture; its data, therefore, must be objective, social facts as reported especially by anthropology and sociology. To a greater or less extent, of course, every writer finds, if not data, at least the keys of comprehension within his own experience; and the impressions gained through his personal associations have doubtless always furnished much important material. Strictly speaking, moreover, perhaps no student of the problem has confined himself to but a single source of facts. Yet there are the wide differences in emphasis which we have indicated, and, for the sake of completeness, perhaps mention should also be made of the eclecticism which characterizes especially the most important recent contribution to the literature of the field, Pratt's *The Religious Consciousness*.

Our citation of the various directions to which psychologists of religion have turned for their data has already furnished glimpses of divergent points of view. In his instructive book on *The Sources of Religious Insight* Royce took exception to James's conception of religion as an individual possession. From a different angle a similar attack was made in Coit's *National Idealism and a State Church*. James was only the most prominent representative of a large group who, whether under the influence of the questionnaire method, of the prevailing theology, of popular belief, or of the regnant psychology, regarded religion as primarily a phase or part of isolated streams of consciousness, as an experience of selves thought of as more or less monadic. To the same point of view belongs the conception of religion as instinctive—a psychological counterpart to the doctrine of personal salvation. Even prior to Royce, Wundt had assailed this position. Religion, like language, he contended is not an expression of an individual consciousness but the product of community life. Where, as in the case of Christianity, Mohammedanism, and Buddhism, there are religions which seem to have personal founders, these have all built on earlier foundations and with

material derived from social sources. Hence the psychology of religion was for Wundt a phase of folk-psychology, and its proper method he believed to be genetic. Durkheim went to even greater lengths in differentiating collective from individual consciousness and in referring to the former not merely religion but everything of universal or trans-subjective import. The individual as such he regarded as but little, if anything, more than a body: at any rate, that which distinguishes him from the beasts he held to be the soul, and this he described as a mode of social or collective consciousness become incarnate. Because of Durkheim's able following among French thinkers and of the impress of his fundamental conceptions upon such important studies as Jane Harrison's *Themis* and Cornford's *From Religion to Philosophy* a real need was met when Webb subjected the doctrine to a searching criticism in his *Group Theories of Religion*. American writers have in the main not been inclined toward exaggerated emphasis upon the social origin or character (as distinct from function) of religion. Most ably and boldly of all, Ames and King have insisted that religion arises from within a social matrix, through a differentiation of social practices and associated sentiments and ideas. Common needs and efforts and socially controlled behavior lie at its basis. Indeed, religion is defined as "the consciousness of the highest social values" and not infrequently seems identified with morality in the sense of social righteousness. It is not always clear, however, whether this means the values associated with that which is most indispensable for the social life or the values socially regarded as supreme: those which are supreme *for* or those which are supreme *to* society. And upon this hinges a further important issue. For only in the latter case could one, with Höffding, associate religious with cosmic feeling, or, with Pratt, unhesitatingly recognize that religion involves belief as well as attitude, and that this belief relates to the existence of a being or of powers having ultimate control over the destinies of man.

With respect to the general conceptions of mind, similar divergencies have appeared. By some, mind is regarded as an existential complex; and the endeavor is made to determine its constituent elements and their relationships. This structural analysis has been attempted also in the case of religious experience. Much more fruitful, however, have been those efforts which have treated mind after the pattern, not of anatomy, but of physiology. Functionalists describe psychical processes as emerging in response to life's needs and as developing, at least initially, under the control of natural and social selection. Conation thus becomes basic; ideation is the child of necessity and finds its justification and its worth in the services it renders. Religion too is said to have its origin in the disparity between man's needs and the conditions in which he finds himself. Ceremonials, designed or adapted to mediate social satisfactions, are its essential features. God thus becomes not so much an object of meditation or creed as a power that is used. Changes in circumstances and hence in social values become the factors that cause the twilight of the gods of old and the evolution of all religious beliefs and forms. For the careful elaboration of this functional interpretation, great credit belongs to Ames and King, and to numerous other writers instructed and inspired by them. It has been contended, however, that biological conceptions and utilitarian biases have kept these scholars from a just appraisal of the theoretical and contemplative aspects of religious experience; moreover, that they have failed to realize that, though thinking and worshiping were in their beginnings (largely, would it not be truer to add?) subservient to the demands of life, they in time became ends in themselves and thenceforth developed along relatively independent lines under the guidance of self-critical reason and consciously evaluated ideals, creating new insights and values, as well as ministering to those already attested. This suggests the advantage of a genetic and empirical treatment which, recognizing that thoroughgoing modifications occur

in the history of the race as of the individual, and guarding against the temptation to impose some favorite theory upon facts, faithfully observes typical levels of evolution (as all phenomena) and describes them in their own terms. In its more characteristic manifestations, mind seems not a psychophysical instrument or function but a principle of conscious aspiration for the attainment of a more rational, universal, and perfect selfhood. This conception, though of course common in idealistic literature and recognized now and again by psychological students of religion, still awaits systematic employment toward the interpretation of man's religious interests and activities. Psychoanalysis has not as yet added greatly to our knowledge of either the mechanism or the dynamics of religious phenomena but not unlikely it too will in the near future have valuable contributions to make. Of behaviorism, in its extreme form, little should be expected. The development of social psychology, on the other hand, augurs well for those concerned to understand religion; and, in time, general and abnormal psychology will speak with greater confidence concerning what is commonly referred to as the subconscious and the coconscious, thus clarifying many problems in connection with which there is as yet little unanimity among religious psychologists.

Wide differences of judgment are being expressed relative to another matter of the very first importance: the relation of the psychology of religion to theology and philosophy. For the functionalist, theology and all branches of philosophy are but phases or departments of psychological investigation. From a radically different viewpoint—that of Positivism—Leuba has vigorously argued, in his *A Psychological Study of Religion*, that theology cannot claim serious consideration until it becomes a branch of psychology. In marked divergence is James's contention that psychology not merely permits the holding of "over-beliefs" but itself opens the way to the belief in a supernatural order that exercises an influence upon

human life through the avenue of the subconscious. Macintosh, on the other hand, argues that God is a direct object of experience and manifests himself immediately to consciousness. Hence he concludes that theology is capable of development as an empirical science. Indeed his volume on *Theology as an Empirical Science* is a fearless attempt to deal with religious doctrines in this manner. Much more commonly, however, it is still held that phenomenological description belongs to psychology; but that psychology, while privileged and competent to deal with every department of human experience, has a distinctive procedure and objective which preclude it from either solving or pronouncing insoluble or unmeaning ontological and metaphysical questions. The more final, comprehensive interpretation of religion, especially as involving existential implications, falls, it seems safe to assert, to the task of philosophy.

III

Psychologists have placed beyond all doubt their competence to illumine the nature and mechanism of religious processes, and the time is at hand when all who have a practical concern with the latter should familiarize themselves with the psychological literature. The cursory way in which we have been compelled to refer to complexities and diversities in respect to character, problems, material, method, and viewpoints may leave the impression that the psychology of religion is in a state of utter and hopeless confusion. But such is not the case. Rather is it true that there is a free and abounding life which has taken varied expressions. This fact only a rigid formalist could deplore. Exploratory movements are greatly to be desired, especially in new fields. It should be remembered, moreover, that in the general and parent science of psychology the lines are still sharply drawn, not alone in respect to particular issues but also with reference to fundamental theory: structuralists, functionalists, behaviorists, self-

psychologists, and psychoanalysts are all still actively vying for the dominance. And few of the phenomena to be dealt with are as complex as those of religion.

If seriously studied, the psychology of religion should deepen insight, rationalize conceptions, refine appreciation, and promote achievement. Certain doctrines and methods may indeed lose their glamor when they are questioned as to their significance in concrete, experiential terms. But surely this is as it should be. The substitution of knowledge for unthinking credulity, and of analytical rigor for the acceptance of facts as simple, may seem disturbing. But experience and religion become all the richer thereby. If the belief that religion is the expression of an innate human faculty or instinct is displaced by real understanding, that is, by some knowledge of the complex factors that do underlie it and that shape its growth, both the naturalness and the inevitability of religion are the more firmly established. The results of psychological study have set into clearer light the fact that religion is not creed but life in its loftiest reach; and they have likewise shown that all man's conscious powers—cognitive, emotional, and conative—enter into its structure. In religion, they have set forth, man possesses a deep sense of personal worth yet likewise the most intimate interrelation with his fellows. If religious efforts and progress were carefully directed by these scientific confirmations of the insights of the finest religious spirits, much, certainly, would be gained.

There are many important questions to which workers in the field of the psychology of religion should now address themselves. Of these we would venture to suggest as significant and timely the following:

(1) What factors underlie decay (*a*) in historical religions and (*b*) in the religious experiences of individuals? What leads to indifference and what to hostility toward institutional religion? How numerous are "non-religious" people? These problems of negativity have not as yet received due attention.

Nor have those connected with religious dogmatism and intolerance. (2) What may be done to protect and foster genuine individuality in an age when press, platform, and pulpit conspire with a multitude of other factors to impress individuals with the *vox populi* or the *vox dei*? The church has developed an enlightened conscience which today pretty much restrains it from exposing men, women, and children to the crowd or mob spirit of shallow revivalism or emotional debauchery in any form. But in its more subtle modes the influence of the crowd-mind in religion, as throughout all of life, is today alarmingly powerful. How prevent those dire consequences of a conventionalization, popularization, and standardization which today interfere with the vigorous growth of an essentially personal and individual life? (3) On the other hand, are we sufficiently mindful that, however careful may be the nurture of the youth or the cultivation in them of socialized attitudes, individuals are destined to find places in existing economic, political, educational, ecclesiastical, and other institutions whose pressure upon the activities and minds of individuals is enormous, if not completely dominant? How may our religious programs become more social in the sense of exhibiting more direct concern for such a conversion of institutions as will make them co-operators in the fostering of spirituality? (4) What importance should be attached to personal decision, the self-conscious adoption of principles, the choosing this day whom one would serve, in distinction from that growth which, as more or less without the presence of self-conscious volition, is relatively continuous? (5) On all sides it is now contended that, in the case of children, the religious aim should be conservation and not redemption. Granting the error of the latter ideal as traditionally held, is the supplanting ideal entirely adequate? To bring out the point, let us assume that through proper education or training the individual may "develop"—or for that matter "acquire"—traits free from selfishness. Is the same true of self-will?

A negative answer is implied in the studies which Baldwin and Royce have made of the rise of self-consciousness. Hence it is that in his *Problems of Christianity* Royce insists on the fundamental validity of the doctrine and the ideal of redemption. Further psychological investigation is imperative. (6) In general, are we excessively dominated by a prejudice for universal as distinct from particular aspects, by likenesses as distinct from differences, by continuities as distinct from novelties? Do our genetic descriptions sufficiently recognize that new facts, relations, values, and capacities emerge in individual as in racial evolution? And as a consequence are not our aims in many respects unhappy? Danger lurks in the attempts to find the key to complex and developed religion in the forms that are simpler and relatively primitive. The biological standpoint is too often maintained when the relations under discussion are social. Lower forms of social life are treated without thought of those more profound, mutually self-conscious, ethically and emotionally pervaded associations possible to man. Thus aspirations are not roused to their highest possibilities and even ideals tend to superficiality.

So much is clear: The psychology of religion has enjoyed a vigorous growth. The scope of its problems has steadily widened. In viewpoint and method, it has manifested rich diversification, reflecting both the interests of individual scholars and great originality of thought. Its contributions alike to scientific knowledge and to the promotion of religion pure and undefiled have been substantial. Yet these are far from exhausting its possibilities. Those who are conversant with its history look forward with confidence to its future; and its present status is certainly such as to justify the highest optimism.